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QUESTION PRESENTED
Can the National Collegiate Athletic Association properly 
ask students who voluntarily participate in its sporting events 
to submit to drug tests to ensure that the athletic competitions 
it sponsors are conducted in as safe, healthful, and fair 
environment as possible?
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
)
JENNIFER HILL et al., )
)
Plaintiffs and Respondents, )
)V. )
)
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, )
)
Defendant and Petitioner. )
)
PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
On Appeal From the Judgment of the Superior Court 
of the State of California, County of Santa Clara 
The Honorable Conrad L. Rushing, Judge
Review of the Court of Appeal,
Sixth District
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Preliminary Statement
On January 6, 1987, plaintiff Simone Levant filed a 
complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") in Santa Clara 
Superior Court. (2 C.T. 1) The action sought to enjoin the NCAA 
from prohibiting Levant's participation in NCAA competitions 
based upon her refusal to comply with its mandatory drug testing 
program. (2 C.T. 2, 16) A preliminary injunction was granted on 
March 13, 1987, prohibiting the NCAA from preventing Levant's 
participa^on in intercollegiate diving competition and from 
enforcing its drug testing program against her. (2 C.T. 19-22) 
The preliminary injunction was dissolved on May 11, 1987, by 
stipulation of the parties when Levant graduated from Stanford 
University and was no longer eligible for NCAA competition. Hiii
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V, National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n.. 223 Cal. App. 3d 1642, 
1649 n.4 (1990).
The respondents, Jennifer Hill and J. Barry McKeever, were 
added as plaintiffs by amended complaints filed in February and 
July, 1987. Id. On July 20, 1987, Stanford University was 
granted leave to intervene on behalf of respondents. (2 C.T. 25)
The court issued a temporary restraining order on August 26, 
1987, prohibiting the NCAA from enforcing the provisions of its 
drug testing program against all Stanford teams and athletes. (2 
C.T. 26-28) On December 18, 1987, the court issued a preliminary 
injunction prohibiting the NCAA from enforcing its drug testing 
program against Stanford or its students except in the sports of 
football and men's basketball. (2 C.T. 78-82) After a trial in 
February and March, 1988, Judge Conrad L. Rushing, sitting 
without a jury, permanently enjoined the NCAA from enforcing the 
provisions of its drug testing program against Stanford and its 
students, including those in football and men's basketball.
Hill. 223 Cal App- 3d at 1649 n.4. The court found that the 
program violated the California constitutional right of privacy 
because the NCAA failed to show a ’compelling need for its drug 
testing program. at 1651. The Court of Appeal for the Sixth
District affirmed. Id. at 1647. This Court granted petition for 
review on December 20, 1990.
Statement of Facts
The petitioner, the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association, is an unincorporated association of more than 1,000 
colleges, universities, and conferences of which Stanford 
University is a member. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic
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Ass*n. , 223 Cal. App. 3d 1642, 1648 (1990). It is the primary
body governing intercollegiate sports in America. Id.
By a vote of its membership at its 1986 annual convention, 
the NCAA established a drug testing program for those 
participating in NCAA championships and NCAA-certified postseason 
football bowl games. (1 C.T. 19) Tests are not conducted before 
or during the regular season. (1 C.T. 31)
The program was approved after several years of study by the 
NCAA that included a report issued by a special drug testing 
committee setting forth a detailed proposal for a drug testing 
program (2 C.T. 92-104) and a Michigan State University study 
commissioned by the NCAA to investigate the extent of drug use by 
college athletes. (2 C.T. 105-26)
The NCAA decided to study this problem following a drug 
scandal that rocked the 1983 Pan American Games. (1 R.T. 7:26- 
11:16) After athletes from another country tested positive for 
drugs, about fifteen United States athletes hurriedly left the 
Games before their competitions were held. (1 R.T. 8:13-20)
Some of them were enrolled at NCAA schools. (1 R.T. 8:21-25)
The purpose of the program is to provide clean, equitable 
competition (1 C.T. 19) and to protect the health and safety of 
participating student-athletes. (2 C.T. 129) The list of 
prohibited substances includes those generally purported to be 
performance enhancing and/or potentially harmful to the health 
and safety of the student-athletes. (2 C.T. 129) The prohibited 
substances are divided into six categories, including one for 
street drugs, such as cocaine and heroin, another that includes 
anabolic steroids, and one that covers sympathomimetic amines,
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some of which are contained in over-the-counter cold and diet 
medications. (2 C.T. 132-33) Although medical experts disagree 
on the performance enhancing effect of many of these drugs, 
testimony from witnesses on both sides confirms that there is a 
perception among athletes that some of these drugs, such as 
steroids, enhance athletic performance. (Supp. R.T. 2) The 
testimony was also undisputed that the use of drugs such as 
amphetamines, cocaine, and steroids can seriously harm the health 
of student-athletes and can cause permanent physiological damage. 
(Supp. R.T. 1)
The NCAA testing procedure is modeled after those used by 
the United States and International Olympic committees. (1 R.T. 
12:6-9) It includes elaborate protocols designed to protect the 
confidentiality of test subjects and results. (2 C.T. 133-37)
All students competing in NCAA-sponsored sports are required to 
sign a consent form agreeing to participate in the drug testing 
program or be ruled ineligible. (2 C.T. 129) The consent form 
is contained in a booklet that includes detailed program 
procedures, a list of the prohibited substances, and penalties 
for failure to conform with program rules. (2 C.T. 127-137)
Students are selected for testing based upon position of 
finish in competition, playing time, random selection, or upon 
suspicion. (2 C.T. 134) Students selected for testing are 
required to complete a form indicating drug use, including over- 
the-counter drugs and prescription medication. (2 C.T. 134) If 
the declaration is consistent with the results of a urine test, a 
student who tests positive will not necessarily be ruled 
ineligible. (2 C.T. 134) Exceptions also may be made for
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students who have a documented medical need for certain 
prohibited drugs. (2 C.T. 130) Students must report for testing 
within an hour after completion of their competition. (2 C.T. 
134) NCAA personnel monitor the process from the time an athlete 
is informed he or she has been selected to produce a urine sample 
to ensure the integrity of the process. (2 C.T. 135) Once a 
student-athlete provides an adequate sample, he or she divides it 
into two bottles marked *'A'* and "B,” the bottles are sealed and 
an secret code number specific to that student-athlete is 
attached. (2 C.T. 135) The student then signs a form attesting 
that there were no irregularities in the procedure. (2 C.T. 135) 
The specimens are shipped to an NCAA-certified laboratory, 
where they are tested by the gas chromatography/mass spectrometry 
method. (2 C.T. 133) These labs are subject to periodic quality 
control checks. (2 C.T. 134) At the lab, the ”A'* sample is 
tested. If the *'A*' sample is positive for any prohibited 
substance, the NCAA is notified and informed of any declaration 
made by the student-athlete on his or her form. (2 C.T. 136) No 
athlete can be suspended until his or her school is notified of 
the result and the "B” sample is tested. If the ”B” sample 
confirms the results of the "A" sample test, the athlete is 
subject to disciplinary action. (2 C.T. 136) First offense 
includes ineligibility from postseason competition for ninety 
days. (2 C.T. 131) If an athlete tests positive for a second 
time after serving a ninety-day suspension, the penalty is T^ss 
of post-season eligibility in all sports for the current and 
following academic year. (2 C.T. 131)
Of the 3,511 athletes tested in the initial year of testing
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during the 1986-87 season, thirty-four were declared ineligible, 
mostly in the sport of football, including two at Stanford.
(Supp. R.T. 7) In 1987-88, there were thirty-one positive tests, 
twenty of them in football. (Supp. R.T. 7)
The respondents, Jennifer Hill and J. Barry McKeever, were 
athletes at Stanford University. (Supp. R.T, 1) Hill was on the 
women's soccer team for four years and served as co-captain her 
senior year. (Supp. R.T. 1) She was tested under the NCAA 
program. (2 C.T. 45) McKeever was a linebacker on the football 
team and attended Stanford on an athletic scholarship. (Supp. 
R.T. 1-2) McKeever signed an NCAA drug testing consent form 
before the 1986 season. (2 R.T. 381:25-382:1) He was given a 
urine test by the NCAA at Stanford before the 1986 Gator Bowl.
(2 R.T. 382:17-21)
Hill and McKeever objected to the drug testing, in part, 
because they found the prospect of urinating in the presence of 
an NCAA monitor objectionable. (Supp. R.T. 2)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The appellate court erred in requiring that the NCAA, a 
private, voluntary organization, show a compelling need in order 
that its drug testing program not violate the privacy provision 
of the California Constitution. The three-part test the court 
imposed on the NCAA necessitated that it show: (1) the purpose 
of the drug testing program relates to its regulatory goals of 
preserving the health of athletes and the integrity of its 
athletic competition; (2) there is a compelling need for the drug 
testing program; and (3) there are no less offensive, viable 
alternatives to the drug testing program. This test, which is
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known as the Baaley test, was created to curtail government 
intrusion into privacy interests. Baalev v. Washington Township 
Hospital Pist. , 65 Cal. 2d 499, 505 (1966). Nothing in Baaley or 
its progeny state that this test of strict scrutiny was intended 
to apply to private, voluntary organizations such as the NCAA.
Private, voluntary organizations are significantly different 
from state actors. Their actions do not require nor should they 
be subjected to the strict scrutiny required of government or 
those acting under the color of law.
Courts, including this one, have recognized that a 
"compelling need” test need not be met in all circumstances in 
which the privacy right is implicated. When danger to health is 
in issue, justification for the invasion of privacy is measured 
by showing that a rational basis for the action exists. Courts 
have also determined whether privacy rights have been violated by 
balancing the individual's right to privacy against the state 
interest involved.
Because the NCAA drug testing program is based substantially 
on health concerns, the rational basis standard would be a proper 
test for this Court to apply. Moreover, as the policy behind its 
drug testing is reasonably related to achieving its health and 
safety goals, the NCAA meets this standard.
Alternatively, the Court should adopt the balancing test 
widely used by this and other courts in privacy cases. Because 
privacy expectations are diminished in the context of athletics, 
the NCAA drug testing program constitutes a "minimal intrusion" 
into the privacy rights of college athletes. It is, therefore, 
apparent that the NCAA has met the balancing test by showing that
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^he in'teres^ of any individual stLuden^ in voluntarily 
participating in intercollegiate competition does not outweigh 
the NCAA's substantial interest in protecting the health and 
safety of student-athletes and the integrity of competition 
through its drug testing program.
Even if the stringent Baalev test applies, the appellate 
court erred in its application because the NCAA met its burden of 
proof at trial. A correct reading of the data demonstrates there 
is substantial drug use among college athletes. Thus, as the 
drug testing program is related to the NCAA's goals of ensuring 
the health of athletes and integrity of competition, the first 
prong of the Bagley test was met. Furthermore, the NCAA program 
is a - necessary and tempered response to the problems of drug 
abuse in sports and society, in showing this compelling need for 
its drug testing program, the NCAA met the second prong of the 
Bagiev test. The final prong of the Bagiev test was met by the 
NCAA when ample evidence was presented that there is no less 
offensive, viable alternative to the drug testing program. The 
appellate court pointed to drug education as a less offensive 
alternative. But in doing so, it merely substituted its beliefs 
for the judgment of a distinguished group of drug education and 
drug testing experts assembled by the NCAA to implement its drug 
testing program. Drug testing is the most effective and accurate 
method for the NCAA to achieve its regulatory goal.
~ ARGUMENT
I. THE APPELLATE COURT APPLIED TOO STRICT A STANDARD IN
EVALUATING THE NCAA'S DRUG TESTING PROGRAM.
A. Introduction
The court erred in holding the NCAA, a private voluntary
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organization, to a standard created to restrict government 
intrusion into the right of privacy.* Nothing in the legislative 
history or the judicial opinions of this or any other court 
supports a conclusion that private, voluntary organizations must 
be held to the same strict standard under Article I, Section 1 of 
the California Constitution that is required of entities whose 
actions rise to the level of state action.^
The appellate court determined that the NCAA had ”to show a 
compelling interest” to justify its drug testing program. Hill 
v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n., 223 Cal. App. 3d 1642, 
1656 (1990). It outlined a three-part test the NCAA was required 
to satisfy to meet its burden of demonstrating a compelling need. 
The test required the NCAA show "that: (1) the testing program 
relates to the purposes of the NCAA regulations which confer the 
benefit (participation in intercollegiate competition); (2) the 
utility of imposing the program manifestly outweighs any 
resulting impairment of the constitutional right; and (3) there 
are no less offensive alternatives.” Id. at 1656-57 (citations 
omitted). The appellate court concluded the NCAA failed to meet
* Because of the important precedential constitutional issues 
in this case, the standard of review is de novo. "'When, as here, 
the application of law to fact requires us to make value judgments 
about the law and its policy underpinnings, and when, as here, the 
application of law to fact is of clear precedential importance, the 
policy reasons for de novo review are satisfied and we should not 
hesitate to review the [trial] judge's determination 
independently,'" People v. Louis. 42 Cal. 3d 969, 988 (1986) 
(quoting tr.S. v. McConnev. 728 F.2d 1195, 1205 (9th Cir. 190+)).
^ Article I, section 1 provides: "All people are by nature 
free and independent and have certain inalienable rights. Among 
these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, 
possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining 
safety, happiness, and privacy." Cal. Const, art. 1, S If amended 
1974.
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all three elements of the test and ruled the drug testing program 
violates the right to privacy. Id, at 1675.
The three-part test used by the appellate court was adopted 
from one created by this Court 25 years ago for use in 
significantly different circumstances. In Baalev v. Washington 
Town_shiP Hospital District. 65 Cal. 2d 499, 510-11 (1966) 
(citations omitted), this Court ruled unconstitutional restraints 
placed on the political activity of a governmental agency 
employee. In doing so, the Court created a three-part test that 
must be met before a "government may, when circumstances 
inexorably- so require, impose conditions upon the enjoyment of 
publicly conferred benefits despite a resulting qualification of 
constitutional rights.” Id. at 505 (emphasis added).
This test, which has since been referred to by the Court as 
the Baaley test, was developed independently of and prior to the 
inclusion of the privacy amendment into the California 
Constitution in 1972. Nothing about its creation or initial 
application indicates it was intended to or should be used in 
cases that concern possible restrictions on privacy imposed by 
private, voluntary organizations such as the NCAA.
Decisions by this Court since the creation of the Baalev 
test have emphasized its applicability to actions of state and 
local government. This was particularly true in the Court's 
clear reformulation and endorsement of the test in Committee to 
Defend Reproductive Rights v. Mvers. 29 Cal. 3d 252 (1981),"5' 
case relied upon by the appellate court in imposing the Baalev 
test on the NCAA. Hill. 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1657. In Myers, the 
Court spoke of "the government's burden of demonstrating the
10
propriety of the condition or limitation under the Bagley test” 
in striking down as unconstitutional legislative restrictions 
placed on state funding for abortions. Myers. 29 Cal. 3d at 268 
(first emphasis added). See also Long Beach Citv Employees 
AsB»n. V, City of Long Beach. 41 Cal, 3d 937, 952-53 (1986) 
(city-required involuntary polygraph tests intrude upon public 
employee's privacy); Robbins v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 3d 199, 
213 (1985) (permitting preliminary injunction preventing 
implementation of county welfare plan preventing single and 
employable residents from receiving cash grants) .
This Court has never applied the Bagiev test to a private, 
voluntary organization such as the NCAA, Bagiev and the cases 
that endorse its three-part test do not define any limits on the 
actions of private, voluntary entities, rather "[t]he premise of 
such cases is that the power of government, federal or state, to 
withhold certain benefits from its citizens does not encompass 
the power to bestow such benefits based on an arbitrary 
deprivation of constitutional rights." Wilkinson v. Times Mirror 
Corp,, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 1050 (1989) (emphasis added) 
(holding that preemployment drug testing by a private employer 
does not violate the privacy provision). Courts have 
historically invoked the Bagiev test to check government abuse, 
not limit private action.
Just as the Bagiev test was unsuitable in this case, so was 
requiring the NCAA show a "compelling need" for the drug testing 
program. That requirement, like the Bagiev test, has its roots 
in limiting government intrusions into constitutionally protected 
areas of privacy. The one federal and one state case cited by
11
the appellate court in imposing this standard on the NCAA concern 
infringements on privacy by government. Hill. 223 Cal, App. 3d 
at 1656, The cases, Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S, 479, 497 
(1965) (striking down Connecticut law regulating birth control 
information provided by a private health clinic), and City of 
Carmel-bv-the-Sea v. Young. 2 Cal. 3d 259, 268 (1970) (holding 
unconstitutional state financial disclosure law for public 
officials), are silent as to the standard that should be imposed 
on a private, voluntary organization such as the NCAA.
Nothing in Baaley^ Young or their progeny state the 
requirement of strict scrutiny was intended to apply to the 
situation before the Court. Private, voluntary organizations are 
significantly different from state actors and therefore their 
actions do not require nor should they be subjected to the strict 
scrutiny required of government or those acting under the color 
of law.
B. In rotelv applying the Baalev test the appellate court 
ignored the important difference between the strict
rules necessary to govern state action and the more 
limited role the state olavs in controlling the
membership of a private, voluntary organization.
Recent federal court decisions are in accord that the NCAA 
is a private entity whose conduct does not rise to the level of 
state action. See, e.g,, 0*Halloran v. University of Washington, 
679 F, Supp. 997, 1002 (W.D. Wash, 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 
856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988), and cases cited therein. Indeed, 
even the United States Supreme Court has held that NCAA 
regulatory functions do not constitute state action, even when a 
member state university enforces the NCAA regulation. National 
Collegiate Athletic Ass*n. v, Tarkanian. 488 U.S. 179, 196
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(1988) .
No one is compelled to join the NCAA; its actions do not 
carry the force of law. The NCAA has ”no government powers to 
facilitate its investigation." Id. at 197. It has "no power to 
subpoena witnesses, to impose contempt sanctions, or to assert 
sovereign authority over any individual." Id. Those who join 
the NCAA voluntarily agree to abide by its regulations. 
Universities are free to leave the NCAA and conduct their 
athletic programs without its sanction and rewards. Athletes are 
free to participate in NCAA-sponsored programs or choose another 
outlet for their athletic endeavors.
The fact that the alternatives to NCAA competition might be 
less-financially rewarding to the school does not mean there are 
no other options. "The university's desire to remain a 
powerhouse among the Nation's college basketball teams is 
understandable, and nonmembership in the NCAA obviously would 
thwart that goal. But that UNLV's options were unpalatable does 
not mean that they were nonexistent." Id. at 198-99 n,19, 
(rejecting an argument that the University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
("UNLV") had no alternative but to join the NCAA and comply with 
its rules).
Neither was Stanford required to join the NCAA, but once it 
did, nothing required the respondents to pursue their personal 
interest in athletics through Stanford teams enrolled in NCAA- 
sponsored "Competition. Both individuals were free to pursue 
their respective interests by other means. But once they 
voluntarily chose to compete in NCAA events, they were obliged to 
follow NCAA regulations. Such an arrangement does not and should
13
not call for the same degree of strict scrutiny necessary to 
guard against involuntary government intrusions into the privacy 
area. The Baalev test therefore was inappropriate.
C. Judicial interpretations of the privacy amendment
provide no support for measuring the actions of a 
private, voluntary organization such as the NCAA by the
same standard that governs state action.
The California privacy provision is not all inclusive. The 
Court declared this in its first decision interpreting the 
privacy amendment when it stated the ''amendment does not purport 
to prohibit all incursion into individual privacy."^ White v. 
Davis. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775 (1975).
The Court reached this conclusion by examining the 
"'legislative history*" of the amendment as contained in the 
"election brochure 'argument'" in favor of its passage. It 
identified four "principle 'mischiefs'" to which the amendment 
was directed. Id. These '"mischiefs'" were "(1) 'government 
snooping' and the secret gathering of personal information; (2) 
the overbroad collection and retention of unnecessary personal 
information by government and business interests; (3) the 
improper use of information properly obtained for a specific 
purpose . . . (4) the lack of a reasonable check on the accuracy
of existing records." Id. (emphasis added).
No reference was made to what, if any, applicability the 
amendment has to private, voluntary organizations such as the 
NCAA. In^he absence of any legislative history to the cont^ry,
^ The Court in White went on to say "such intervention must be 
justified by a compelling interest" in finding that police covert 
surveillance on a state university campus constituted a prima facie 
violation of the privacy provision. White. 13 Cal. 3d at 775-76. 
But unlike the present case, White concerned state action.
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the appellate court had no reason to conclude the privacy 
provision was intended to cover the NCAA's drug testing program. 
Such a narrow reading of the intent of the privacy provision is 
not without precedent. In People v. Privitera. 23 Cal. 3d 697, 
709 (1979), the Court relied on these grounds in ruling the 
"right of privacy does not encompass a right of access to drugs 
of unproven efficacy" such as laetrile. "In the absence of any 
evidence that the voters in amending the California Constitution 
to create a right of privacy intended to protect conduct of the 
sort engaged in by defendants, we have no hesitation in holding" 
this action does not "offend that constitutional provision." I(Ll 
at 709-10.
Moreover, this Court has never held that the state 
constitutional guarantee of privacy applies to private interests, 
let alone the more limited interests of a private, voluntary 
organization. As recently as two and one-half years ago, the 
Court reserved judgment on whether the privacy provision applies 
at all in cases of a private entity. Schmidt v. Superior Court* 
48 Cal. 3d 370, 389 n.l4 (1989). In Schmidt, the Court, in 
upholding a minimum age requirement on mobilehome park residents, 
declined to say "under what circumstances, if any, purely private 
action by a property owner or landlord would constitute a 
violation of the state constitutional privacy provision." Id. 
(emphasis added) . The Court has thus implicitly recognized that 
distinctly different considerations apply in determining whether 
the acts of private entities impact on the right to privacy.
Lower courts have acknowledged this difference. "At least 
some types of nongovernmental conduct can interfere with the
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Semore v. Pool.right granted by the constitutional provision.”
217 Cal. App. 3d 1087, 1094 (1990) (emphasis added). See also 
Wilkinson, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1040. This limiting language is 
implicit recognition that restrictions on nongovernment action 
under the privacy clause are not as severe as restrictions on 
state action. It follows that private entities should not be 
held to the standard of "compelling need.”
Even the appellate court recognized that courts have not 
always required a showing of "compelling need” in cases impacting 
on the right to privacy. Hill, 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1656 n.7. It 
nevertheless chose to ignore this body of law and impose the 
"compelling need” standard set forth in Baalev. The court 
justified its action on the ground that the "California courts 
deciding claims under article 1, section 1, require the state to 
show a compelling interest before it can invade a fundamental 
privacy right." Hill. 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1656 (emphasis added). 
This unqualified statement ignores the extensive body of law 
developed by this Court and the lower courts, holding that a 
"compelling need" test need not be met in all circumstances in 
which the privacy right is implicated.
D. When danger to health is in issue, courts have applied
a rational basis test.
Indeed, in cases involving medical care, the Court has said 
that "when danger to health exists . . . state regulation shall 
be tested^nder the rational basis standard.” Privitera. 23—Cal. 
3d at 703 (citing Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973)). Under 
this approach, justification for the invasion of privacy will be 
measured by a showing that a rational basis for the action 
exists. The action must bear "a reasonable relationship to the
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achievement of" the goal of protecting the "health and safety" of 
those concerned. Privitera. 23 Cal. 3d at 708-09. This requires 
a considerably lesser showing than that needed to meet the 
compelling need test.
This lower showing for health care matters was reaffirmed by 
the Court in Conservatorship of Valerie N.. 40 Cal. 3d 143 
(1985). In upholding a lower court decision that prevented 
sterilization of a conservatee, the Court cited Privitera while 
noting that "[n]o suggestion is made here that the restriction is 
justified because the medical procedure poses a significant 
danger to the health of the patient. We need not consider, 
therefore, whether a lesser interest would meet the 
constitutional imperative." Valerie N.. 40 Cal. 3d at 164 n.26. 
The implication is clear: Not all circumstances require a 
showing of compelling need. Some invasions of privacy interests 
are justified by satisfying a lesser standard.
E. In other contexts, courts have applied a balancing
approach in privacy cases without anv mention of a
compelling need component.
In addition to applying a rational basis test, courts have 
used a balancing test in several privacy amendment cases. This 
Court adopted this balancing approach in Valley Bank v. Superior 
Court. 15 Cal. 3d 652 (1975). There the Court balanced a 
person’s right to privacy against the state interest involved.
In declining to order the bank to release certain confidential 
information in the context of a civil suit, the Court ruled it 
must "indulge in a careful balancing of the right of the civil 
litigants to discover relevant facts, on the one hand, with the 
right of bank customers to maintain reasonable privacy regarding
17
their financial affairs, on the other.” Id. at 657.
The Court followed this balancing approach in Dovle v. State 
Bar, 32 Cal, 3d 12 (1982), In Dovle. the Court ruled the State 
Bar of California did not violate the right to privacy in 
requiring an attorney to turn over records in connection with a 
disciplinary proceeding. The "privacy interest is not absolute 
but must be balanced against the need for disclosure." Id. at 20 
(emphasis added). Once again the Court recognized limits to the 
privacy right and that the right must be weighed against other 
legitimate concerns.
Other courts have followed this Court's lead and applied a 
balancing test in a variety of factual settings in which the 
California constitutional right to privacy has been implicated. 
These include deciding whether to compel discovery of 
confidential medical records, Heda v. Superior Court. 225 Cal. 
App. 3d 525, 528 (1990) ("Defendant's privacy interests must be 
weighed against plaintiff's interest in obtaining trial 
preference."); attempts to interfere with the right to an 
abortion, Chico Feminist Women's Health Center v. Butte Glenn 
Medical Society. 557 F. Supp. 1190, 1204 (E.D. Cal. 1983) ("the 
court must balance the severity of the harm caused"), and most 
importantly in two recent decisions concerning drug testing of 
employees and job applicants.^ Semore, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1087;
* Lower courts are not in agreement on which standard is 
appropriate in the private employment setting. See Soroka v. 
Davton Hudson Coro.. 91 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13204, 13207 (Oct. 25, 
1991) (compelling need required by employer for psychological 
testing of job applicants); Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation 
Co, 218 Cal, App. 3d 1, 20 (1990) (rejects balancing approach in 
favor of compelling interest test in case involving drug testing of 
employees). But these courts did not reach the present issue of 
which standard applies to private, voluntary organizations.
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Wilkinson, 215 Cal. App, 3d 1034.
In semore. the court applied a "balancing test” in 
considering whether the discharge of an employee for refusing to 
consent to a random pupillary reaction eye test violated his 
right to privacy. Semore, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 1097. "The 
resolution of the dispute depends upon balancing an employee's 
expectations of privacy against the employer's needs to regulate 
the conduct of its employees at work.” Id. The court did not 
rule on the constitutionality of the test, holding only that the 
trial court erred in deciding the issue on a demurrer. Id. at 
1100.
Semore followed the balancing approach in workplace drug 
testing issues enumerated three months earlier in Wilkinson, The 
court in Wilkinson held constitutional a preemployment drug 
testing program against a challenge under the privacy amendment. 
**A court must engage in a balancing of interests rather than a 
deduction from principle to determine [privacy right] 
boundaries." Wilkinson. 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1046. The court 
said that "as long as that right is not substantially burdened or 
affected, justification by a compelling interest is not required. 
Instead, the operative question is whether the challenged conduct 
is reasonable." Id. at 1047.
Therefore, nothing dictates that a court apply a "compelling 
need" test in all privacy cases. Courts have adopted different 
standards^depending on the parties involved and interests bHxng 
protected. Because the NCAA is a private, voluntary organization 
whose regulatory functions do not rise to the level of state 
action, the test of strict scrutiny imposed by the lower courts
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was inappropriate.
II. THE DETERMINATION OF WHAT STANDARD SHOULD APPLY TO THE
NCAA*S DRUG TESTING PROGRAM TURNS ON THE INTEREST TO BE
PROTECTED.
A. Because this issue concerns public health, the proper
test for this Court to apply is the rational basis test
enumerated in Privitera.
As one of the NCAA*s primary functions is to protect the 
health of athletes, its drug testing program should be judged 
under the rational basis standard enumerated in Privitera.
In Privitera. the defendants were found guilty of conspiring 
to prescribe and sell the drug laetrile under a statute that 
prohibits distribution of all unapproved drugs for the 
alleviation or cure of cancer. Privitera. 23 Cal. 3d at 701.
The statute is based on a concern that the use of such unproven 
drugs can lead to improper medical care and further health risk. 
Id. at 705-06. "If the state has the power to ban a drug with a 
recognized medical use because of its potential for abuse, then 
— given a rational basis for doing so — the state clearly has 
the power to ban a drug not recognized as effective for its 
intended use. Id, at 705. The issue and concern in this case is 
similar.
The NCAA drug-testing program also is based on substantial 
health concerns. (2 C.T. 129) The NCAA is concerned about 
improper drug use and the damaging effect it has on the health of 
athletes. Some of these drugs, such as cocaine and marijuana, 
not only are unapproved; they are illegal. Others, such as 
steroids, pose a serious health risk if used for other than their 
intended purpose or in dosages exceeding those recommended. 
Steroids have been linked to liver failure, tumors and a host of
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o^her serious health problems. (2 R.T. 268:8-272:20)
The debate over the usefulness of steroids in athletic 
competition is comparable to the debate over the efficacy of 
laetrile and its benefits to cancer patients. If the state of 
California is allowed to justify the protections designed to 
ensure the health of its residents under a rational basis test, 
it logically follows that an organization such as the NCAA, whose 
purpose includes fostering healthy, clean athletic competition 
between college athletes, should be judged by the same standard.
Under the test established in Privitera, the inquiry is 
limited to deciding whether the challenged policy bears "a 
reasonable relationship to the achievement of the legitimate" 
health and safety goal. Privitera. 23 Cal. 3d at 702- The 
NCAA*s drug testing meets this standard. The threat of drug 
testing can be a legitimate deterrent to drug use. 0*Halloran. 
679 F. Supp. at 1004. Additionally, the detection of drug use 
through testing can lead to needed diagnostic and therapeutic 
help for the athlete.
B- Alternatively, the Court should adopt the balancing 
test widely used by this and other courts in privacy
cases.
If the Court is unwilling to adopt a rational basis standard 
for the NCAA's drug testing program, then it should apply a 
balancing test. In fact, this Court used a balancing test in 
another privacy case that concerned internal disciplinary action. 
In Doyle, ^he Court found the interest of the State Bar of — 
California in conducting a disciplinary proceeding outweighed an 
attorney's interest in the privacy of his records. Dovle. 32 
Cal. 3d at 20-21. A related issue confronts the Court in this
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case. Instead of a question of disciplining an attorney, the 
issue is whether the interest of the NCAA in preserving the 
health of athletes and the integrity of its athletic competition 
through the disciplinary means of a drug testing program 
outweighs the objections on privacy grounds of any individual 
athlete.
Some lower courts have utilized a "reasonableness” or 
"balancing” test in cases concerning drug testing. See 
Wilkinson. 215 Cal. App. 3d 1034; Semore. 217 Cal. App. 3d 1087. 
wi ikinson and Semore differ from this case in that they concerned 
the rights of employees or job applicants. The right to a job is 
a more fundamental right than that of participating in voluntary 
athletic competition, yet a "reasonableness” or "balancing" 
approach was all the courts required to protect that right under 
the privacy provision. It naturally follows then that if such an 
approach was all that was necessary to protect employment rights, 
it should more than suffice in this case.
The United States Supreme Court also has adopted a balancing 
test for use in drug testing cases in an employment setting. See 
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives* Ass'n.. 489 U.S. 602 (1989) 
(upheld drug testing of railroad employees) ; National Treasury 
Employees Union v. Von Raab. 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (upheld 
suspicionless drug testing of U.S. Customs Service employees). 
Using this balancing test, a court weighs the public interest in 
the testing program "against the privacy concerns implicatecT^y 
the tests." Von Raab. 489 U.S. at 679. The test has its roots 
in the Fourth Amendment balancing approach utilized in issues 
involving searches and seizures. Skinner. 489 U.S. at 619.
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Because this Court has applied a balancing test in cases 
involving the right to privacy and because the United States 
Supreme Court has adopted a balancing test for use in drug test 
cases, a balancing approach is a proper test to apply to the 
NCAA's drug testing program.
One federal court already has ruled that the NCAA program 
satisfies a balancing test. OJHalloran. 679 F. Supp. at 1000. 
The court concluded "the larger interests of the health of the 
student-athlete as well as the public's and the competing 
athletes* perception of the fairness of intercollegiate athletics 
greatly outweighs the relatively small compromise of an 
individual's privacy interest, which is diminished in the context 
of collegiate athletics." Id. at 1007.
Similar diminished expectations of privacy were a critical 
factor in tipping the balancing test in Skinner in favor of 
upholding the drug testing program. The Court found the tests 
posed "only limited threats to the justifiable expectations of 
privacy." Skinner. 489 U.S. at 628. See also Miller v. Murohv, 
143 Cal. App. 3d 337, 343-44 (1983) ("Some constitutional 
restrictions, even though identified with the right to privacy, 
are deserving of less than strict scrutiny because of their 
minimal intrusion into a person's privacy.") (emphasis added) 
(upholding local ordinances requiring pawnbrokers to obtain 
customers' fingerprints).
T. Because privacy expectations are diminished irTthe
context of athletics, the NCAA drug testing 
program constitutes a "minimal intrusion" into the
privacy rights of college athletes.
The conditions under which college athletes compete and
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train substantially diminish their expectations of privacy in 
connection with athletic competition. Athletes routinely submit 
to physical examinations and thus "reasonably should expect 
effective inquiry into their fitness and probity." Von Raab. 489 
U.S. at 672. They frequently undress around teammates in an open 
locker room setting. They urinate in shared lavatory facilities. 
(2 R.T. 402:26-403:26). Under these conditions random drug 
testing is a reasonable intrusion into their privacy. See 
n*Halloran. 679 F. Supp. at 1005; Schaill bv Kross v. Tippecanoe 
rnuntv School Corp. . 864 F.2d 1309, 1318 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(upholding drug testing program for high school athletes against 
constitutional privacy attack).
The history of drug testing in sports further diminishes the 
privacy expectation of college athletes. Drug testing is 
mandatory in Olympic sports. The NCAA program is modeled after 
those conducted by United States and International Olympic 
committees. Hill. 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1648. In light of the 
experience and practice of these athletic organizations, the 
respondents should not have expected to be exempt from compliance 
when the NCAA instituted a similar program.
2. The interest of the NCAA in providing clean,
equitable competition and protecting the health
and safety of student-athletes outweighs the
privacy interests of individual participants.
The NCAA has a legitimate concern about drug use in sports. 
The respondents contend that the NCAA has overstated this 
problem, but the United States Supreme Court has declared "there 
can be no doubt that drug abuse is one of the most serious 
problems confronting our society today." Von Raab. 489 U.S. at
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674. The Court also observed "[t]here is little reason to 
believe that American workplaces are immune from this pervasive 
social problem." Id. The same is true of collegiate sports.
The first school year of NCAA drug testing resulted in 
thirty-four athletes ruled ineligible, the second year twenty- 
one. Hill, 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1660-61. But these results are 
not conclusive as to the amount of drug use by college athletes. 
A survey conducted for the NCAA in 1984 showed widespread use of 
several drugs on the NCAA banned list. (2 C.T. 105-126) 
According to the survey, 36% of college athletes had used 
marijuana or hashish within one year of the survey date, 31% had 
used anti-inflamatories, 28% major pain medication, 17% cocaine, 
8% amphetamines, 4% psychedelics, and 2% barbiturates or 
tranquilizers. (2 C.T. 125)
The respondents would have the Court believe that the lack 
of more positive tests is proof drug use among college athletes 
is minimal. But a better conclusion is that the lack of more 
positives is proof of the program's success. The court in 
Q'Halloran recognized this likely result by observing the testing 
will "have a deterrent effect, and that over time less evidence 
[of drug use] will be found," O'Halloran. 679 F. Supp. at 1004.
Nor should the relatively low number of positive drug tests 
render a drug testing program unnecessary. "Such evidence of the 
program's success should not be used to demonstrate lack of need 
for the program or that the program has no reasonable basisT”"
Id. "The mere circumstance that all but a few of the employees 
tested are entirely innocent of wrongdoing does not impugn the 
program's validity." Von Raab. 489 U.S. at 674. "When the
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Government's interest lies in deterring highly hazardous conduct, 
a low incidence of such conduct, far from impugning the validity 
of the scheme for implementing this interest, is more logically 
viewed as a hallmark of success." Id. at 675-76 n.3.
The NCAA also has a significant interest in sponsoring 
competitions that are untainted by drug use. Drug-free 
competitors ensure that NCAA events are fair, honest and clean. 
The integrity of the NCAA and value of its sponsored events would 
be seriously impaired by any taint from drugs. More importantly, 
the NCAA must ensure that only healthy athletes are placed into 
competition. An organization sponsoring athletic events would 
not be fulfilling its responsibilities if it allowed unhealthy 
athletes to compete.
Having established the NCAA has a need for its drug testing 
program, the Court must next consider whether the procedures used 
by the NCAA adequately protect privacy rights. The lower courts 
concluded that the NCAA program interfered with an athlete's 
"right to keep medical confidentiality" and might keep athletes 
from "taking a needed medication for fear that it will result in 
a positive drug test." Hill. 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1666, 1668.
Such fears are groundless because the NCAA will not punish those 
who declare before testing that they have a documented medical 
need for some of the drugs that are included on the banned list.
(2 C.T. 130)
Drug testing is part of a medical program designed by the 
NCAA to ensure the health of its competing athletes. (2 C.T.
129) Some intrusion into privacy is a necessary component of 
almost all forms of medical care. The United States Supreme
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Court acknowledged this in upholding a New York law requiring 
disclosure to the state of patient use of some prescription 
drugs. Recognizing there are a "host" of "unpleasant invasions 
of privacy that are associated with many facets of health care," 
the Court said "[n]evertheless, disclosures of private medical 
information to doctors, to hospital personnel, to insurance 
companies, and to public health agencies are often an essential 
part of modern medical practice even when the disclosure may 
reflect unfavorably on the character of the patient." Whalen v. 
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977).
In this regard, the NCAA has taken precautions to ensure 
that whatever disclosures of medical history required of the 
athlete be treated with confidentiality. Only if an athlete *s 
"A" sample of urine tests positive for a prohibited substance 
will laboratory personnel inform the NCAA of any information on 
an athlete's declaration form that might indicate that a medical 
condition or declared drug might account for the positive result 
(2 C.T. 136) Otherwise the samples are identified only by a 
secret code. (2 C.T. 135) No athlete or school names are 
supposed to be attached to the urine samples.
Program provisions that appear most intrusive into privacy 
rights are actually the procedures most crucial in guaranteeing 
athletes receive accurate test results. Monitoring of the 
athlete while producing a sample is critical to this end. This 
procedure diminishes the possibility of an incorrect result by 
assuring that the sample tested belongs to the athlete.
"[Vjisual . . . monitoring of the act of urination" might be 
required as part of a drug testing program and because of "the
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desirability of such a procedure to ensure the integrity of the 
sample." Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617, 626, Still, the NCAA has 
tried to honor individual privacy concerns by conducting the 
monitoring as discretely as possible. In the case of the 
respondent, Barry McKeever, the monitor stood behind him and did 
not directly observe him produce a sample. (2 R.T. 389:24-391:2) 
The need for the drug testing program and the safeguards 
taken by the NCAA to ensure its integrity must be balanced 
against the diminished privacy expectations of the student 
athletes and the nature of the interest being protected.
The chance to play college football, soccer or any other 
sport is not a fundamental right. "It is certainly relevant to 
the ultimate question of constitutionality . . . that the 
activity to which random testing is attached is participating in 
an extracurricular activity. Random testing is not ... a 
condition of a weightier benefit such as employment or school 
attendance." Schaill bv Kross. 864 F.2d at 1313.
The NCAA has met the balancing test by showing that the 
interest of any individual student in voluntarily participating 
in intercollegiate competition does not outweigh the NCAA's 
substantial interest in protecting the health and safety of 
student-athletes and the integrity of competition through its 
drug testing program.
III. EVEN IF THE STRINGENT BAGLEY TEST APPLIES, THE APPELLATE 
COURT-ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION BECAUSE THE NCAA MET ITS_ 
BURDEN OF PROOF AT TRIAL.
Contrary to the conclusion of the lower courts, the NCAA 
drug testing program is constitutional because it meets the 
requirements of the Baalev test.
28
Under this test, the NCAA was required to show that: "(1) 
the testing program relates to the purposes of the NCAA 
regulation which confer the benefit (participation in 
intercollegiate competition); (2) the utility of imposing the 
program manifestly outweighs any resulting impairment of the 
constitutional right; and (3) there are no less offensive 
alternatives." Hill. 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1656-57 (citations 
omitted).
A. The NCAA met the first prong of the Baalev test bv
proving that the purpose of its drug testing program is
related to its regulatory goals of preserving the
health of athletes and the integrity of its athletic
competition.
The NCAA is a private, voluntary organization that sponsors 
intercollegiate athletic competition. In order to ensure the 
fairness of such competition the NCAA instituted its drug testing 
program "[s]© that no one participant might have an artificially 
induced advantage, so that no one participant might be pressured 
to use chemical substances in order to remain competitive and to 
safeguard the health and safety of participants." (2 C.T. 129) 
These goals all relate to the NCAA*s stated purpose.
The appellate court ruled that the program conducted by the 
NCAA did not meet these goals because the program itself was 
flawed. Hill. 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1657-65, 1675. A sampling of 
the court's findings shows that its conclusions are not supported 
by the evidence.
The court found, for example, that because the NCAA uses 
three different laboratories, results between the three could 
vary. Id. at 1664. But in doing so, the lower court ignored 
evidence that, all labs must be approved by the NCAA and are
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subject to "periodic quality check[s]” to ensure compliance with 
NCAA standards. (2 C.T. 134)
The court also incorrectly concluded that "[a]11 evidence 
taken together demonstrated that there was no drug involvement in 
any sport except football, and that the problem related only to 
steroid use and involved a small minority of football players." 
Hill> 223 Cal- App. 3d at 1662. This conclusion is in direct 
conflict with undisputed testimony. Of the fifty-five players 
declared ineligible in the first two years of the drug testing 
program, all but three were football players and thirty-two of 
those were declared ineligible for steroid use. Id. at 1660-61. 
But that does not mean there was no involvement in any other 
sport or that no drugs other than steroids were involved. In 
fact, fourteen players were ineligible because of positive 
results for street drugs such as cocaine and marijuana. Id. at 
1661.
The court also failed to note that the primary reason the 
drug problem appears limited to football is because the vast 
majority of athletes subjected to drug testing were football 
players. In 1987-88, for example, 1,425 of the 1,589 (89,7%) 
athletes tested were football players. Id. With such an 
emphasis on testing participants in one sport played entirely by 
men, the court should not have found so significant the finding 
that no female athletes tested positive. Id. at 1660.
The court took this lack of positives to conclude that drug 
use is not a problem in college sports. In so doing it 
completely ignored the better explanation that the testing had 
the desired deterrent effect. See O'Halloran. 679 F, Supp. at
30
1004 .
Such incorrect interpretations of the drug testing data and 
procedures led the lower courts to erroneously conclude the NCAA 
drug testing program does not relate to its regulatory goals. A 
correct reading of the data demonstrates there is drug use among 
college athletes and that the NCAA's testing procedures are 
valid. On the basis of this evidence the conclusion is 
inescapable that as the drug testing program is related to the 
NCAA's goals of ensuring the health of athletes and integrity of 
competition, the first prong of the Baalev test was met.
B. Bv showing there is a compelling need for the drug
testing program, the NCAA satisfied the second prong of
the Bagiev test.
The NCAA has a compelling interest in protecting the health 
and safety of its athletes and ensuring fair athletic 
competition. The appellate court either ignored or casually 
dismissed the NCAA's arguments in this area when it erroneously 
concluded that it failed to meet the second prong of the Bagiev 
test.
Uncontroverted evidence was presented that all drugs on the 
NCAA banned list are harmful if misused. Hill, 223 Cal. App- 3d 
at 1668. The lower courts trivialized this finding by noting 
"[a]spirin and even water can be dangerous if misused.” Id. But 
the NCAA is not concerned about the use of aspirin and water.
Its list of banned drugs includes such illegal street drugs as 
cocaine, marijuana and heroin, in addition to other substances 
"purported to be performance enhancing and/or potentially harmful 
to the health and safety of the student-athlete." (2 C.T. 129) 
Testimony from the respondent's own expert witness. Dr. David T.
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Lowenthal, identified drugs on the banned list as having the 
potential to cause testicular atrophy, liver damage, tumors, 
adverse reactions on the cardiovascular system such as 
arrhythmias, hair growth, acne, and host of other side effects, 
many which were identified as irreversible. (2 R.T. 267:25- 
287:26) While it is true that some of the banned compounds can 
be found in common over-the-counter remedies, this should not be 
cause to invalidate the program. The NCAA is not trying to halt 
the therapeutic use of such substances. Athletes whose declared 
use of these substances is consistent with their test result are 
not subject to disciplinary action. (1 R.T. 38:1-39:7) Under 
this procedure, the appellate court's concern that ''[b]anning so 
many useful medications may actually be harmful to the health and 
safety of the athletes who are likely to be afraid of taking a 
needed medication for fear that it will result in a positive drug 
test" is groundless. Hill. 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1668. The NCAA 
is not out to punish therapeutic use of such medications; its 
purpose is to stop the abuse of these substances.
The NCAA presented evidence that many of the banned 
substances can affect athletic competition. Some of these drugs 
can enhance athletic competition, while others were shown to 
hinder performance. Either way the ability to conduct fair 
competition is affected. The lower court was preoccupied with a 
concern for deciding which drugs might be performance enhancing 
and which itright not while ignoring the conclusion that any — 
improper drug use can have an adverse affect on the integrity of 
athletic competition and the health of athletes.
The appellate court also questioned the failure of the
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program to test for alcohol use or ban smoking, at 1668-69.
This criticism is irrelevant. 5ee Loworn v. city nf 
Chattanooga. 846 F.2d 1539, 1544 (6th Cir. 1988) (argument that 
urinalysis unconstitutional because alcohol abuse problems not 
addressed "cloudCs] the complainant's true criticisms of drug 
testing," since "problems of underinclusiveness are rarely 
problems of constitutional magnitude unless they signify 
impermissible discriminatory motives").
The NCAA program is a necessary and tempered response to the 
problems of drug abuse in sports and society. Through this 
program the NCAA attempts to ensure fair competition and the 
health and safety of the its athletes. The importance of these 
goals outweigh the minimal intrusion of privacy required for 
their attainment. This is particularly true with athletes, whose 
expectation of privacy is diminished by the communal nature of 
the locker room and the need for regular physical examinations.
In showing that there is a compelling need for its drug testing 
program, the NCAA met the second prong of the Baalev test.
C. The final prong _of . the Bagiev test was met by the NCAA
at trial when ample evidence was presented that there
is no viable alternative to the drug testing program.
Drug testing is the best method for the NCAA to achieve its 
regulatory goal. The appellate court points to drug education as 
a more economical and effective means of combating the drug abuse 
problem. Hill. 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1673. But no evidence was 
presented Tn this regard. It merely is the supposition of tHe 
respondent converted into findings of fact. The court has 
substituted its beliefs for the judgment of a distinguished group 
of drug education and drug testing experts assembled by the NCAA
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to Implement its drug testing program. (2 C.T. 92)
Much study went into the creation of this program. The 
result reflects the collective judgment of the NCAA staff, its 
member schools, and worldwide recognized experts in the field of 
drugs in sports. (2 C.T. 92-104)
Those experts, such as Dr. Dan Hanley, a member of the NCAA 
drug testing committee who has a thirty-one-year involvement in 
international sports, are convinced that testing programs such as 
those conducted by the NCAA are the best way to combat drug 
abuse:
I have watched them use regulations, inspection of luggage, 
inspection of quarters, education, brochures, posters, 
speeches. It*s my firm belief that if you're going to 
control drugs in sport, you've got to do testing and you've 
got to do good testing under a strict protocol where the 
athlete is protected.
(1 R.T, 47:23-48:4) To conduct a program without the procedural 
safeguards recommended by the experts, such as monitoring of the 
sample production, would subject the athletes to an increased 
risk of error and unwarranted suspicion. Moreover, the 
opportunity for athletes to cheat would decrease the NCAA's 
ability to assist students suffering from drug abuse and diminish 
the program's deterrent effect. (Supp. R.T. 1)
In showing that there are no viable alternatives to drug 
testing in meeting its regulatory goals, the NCAA satisfied the 
final prong of the Baalev test.
^ CONCLUSION
At a time when an authority as mighty as the United States 
Supreme Court calls drug abuse "one of the most serious problems 
confronting our society today," Von Raab. 489 U.S. at 674, the 
drug testing program of the NCAA is the most modern means
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available to deter the use of drugs in sports. The program poses 
a minimal intrusion into the privacy rights of the athletes while 
meeting the mission of the NCAA to protect the health and safety 
of its student athletes while ensuring the integrity of 
intercollegiate competition.
The petitioner prays that the Court vacate the permanent 
injunction prohibiting it from conducting its drug testing 
program at Stanford University.
Dated: November 5, 1991.
Respectfully submitted,
Julie Reagin
Curt Holbreich
Counsel for Petitioner
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